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Abstract 
This paper begins from the claim that the currently dominant approaches to the study of political 
resistance in global politics, namely the (Neo-)Gramscian and Foucauldian traditions, suffer from a 
common problem in that the forms of resistance they conceptualise are highly susceptible to 
appropriation by, or reinscription within, prevailing forms of global ordering. In an attempt to 
respond to this shortcoming, or, more properly, to explore how this reinscription of resistance might 
itself be resisted, the paper offers an account of political resistance developed using the thought of 
Jacques Derrida. Having established the parallel between the way in which prevailing relations of 
sovereign power and governmental ordering all too quickly co-opt and engulf resistance, and the 
way in which metaphysics calls thought back to order and tends towards onto-political totalisation, it 
is argued that by means of a deconstructive approach, acts of resistance may be further radicalised 
by adding to them second- and third-order onto-political critiques—namely of the resistance-act 
itself and the agent or actor of resistance herself. The core claim made is that inasmuch as 
deconstruction attempts to interrupt forms of thinking and knowing right up to and including 
processes of conscious and unconscious subjectification, it can provide valuable means by which the 
micro-gestures of onto-politics can be resisted at the (fundamentally interrelated) levels of political 
thought and concrete praxis. 
 
Introduction 
The study of political resistance in the field of global politics has expanded and diversified over the 
last decade; the escalation of global dissent and protest activities, from the Arab uprisings to the 
Occupy movements, to ongoing struggles against the neo-liberalisation of higher education and the 
privatisation of public sector institutions, has injected renewed energy into academic research on 
the topic. In the Anglophone literature, the emergent scholarship has fallen broadly into two main 
traditions, namely a (Neo-)Gramscian approach and a Foucault-inspired orientation. These divergent 
approaches suffer, however, from a common problem in that the forms of resistance they 
conceptualise are highly susceptible to appropriation by, or reinscription within, prevailing forms of 
global ordering. In particular, existing accounts of the subject or agent of resistance, whether framed 
in terms of Gramscian counter-hegemonic social movements or the Foucauldian practitioner of 
counter-conduct, frequently fall prey to enacting unwitting reproductions of precisely the forms of 
both macro and micro-disciplinary processes of ordering they seek to resist. As Lara Montesinos 
ColeŵaŶ aŶd KaƌeŶ TuĐkeƌ Ŷote, ͚goǀeƌŶŵeŶtal poǁeƌ ŵaǇ ďe eǆeƌĐised aŶd the status Ƌuo 
staďilised iŶ aŶd thƌough eǀeŶ the ŵost gƌassƌoots oƌ suďalteƌŶ pƌaĐtiĐes of ĐoŶtestatioŶ͛ ;ϮϬϭϭ, p. 
401). More forcefully put, in Judith Butler's words, one may believe that one is resisting, for instance, 
FasĐisŵ, ͚oŶlǇ to fiŶd that the ideŶtifiĐatoƌǇ souƌĐe of oŶe's oǁŶ oppositioŶ is FasĐisŵ itself, aŶd that 
FasĐisŵ depeŶds esseŶtiallǇ oŶ the kiŶd of ƌesistaŶĐe oŶe offeƌs͛ ;ϮϬϬϬ, p. ϭϳϯͿ.ϭ 
In an attempt to respond to this problem of the reappropriation of resistance back into the folds of 
global ordering, or, more properly, how this reinscription might itself be resisted, this paper builds 
upon the existing critical literature by offering a conceptualisation of political resistance and its 
agents or subjects utilising the thought of Jacques Derrida. The argument made begins from 
Derrida's claim that politics and metaphysics are fundamentally interrelated; the paper shows that a 
parallel may be drawn between the way in which prevailing relations of sovereign power and 
governmental ordering all too quickly co-opt and engulf resistance, and the way in which 
metaphysics calls thought back to order and tends towards onto-political totalisation. Both political 
and metaphysical ordering, it is suggested, operate through a cumulative plethora of micro-
disciplinary gestures, sometimes clearly, but often imperceptibly, closing down avenues of thought 
and steering potentially disruptive action back towards the status quo. Accordingly, resistance to 
such ordering processes must meet both these obvious and barely visible but endless series of 
cooptations as they occur, pulling, in a variety of different directions, away from the appropriation of 
thought and action back into the same. It is here that a deconstructive approach to resistance has 
purchase; insofar as the ceaseless movements of deconstruction seek to knock relentless processes 
of ontologisation off course, they endeavour to interrupt and thereby resist such intricate processes 
of conceptual consolidation. 
Consequently, while not claiming that such a formulation can finally avoid or resolve this complex 
problem, it is suggested that Derrida's thought provides means by which acts of resistance may be 
further radicalised, as they are conceived of and enacted, by adding to them second- and third-order 
onto-political critiques—namely of the resistance-act itself and the agent or actor of resistance 
herself—intended to pull away from such ontologisation. The paper argues that such second- and 
third-order critiques can have at least three politically radical consequences: an insistence on the 
limitlessness of responsibility which takes seriously the urgency of the political; the politicisation of 
intervention precisely as a consequence of its ultimate indefensibility; and the self-conscious 
attempt of the subject to interrogate and thereby endeavour to (re)write herself in light of the 
aforementioned. It thus proposes a different kind of subject of resistance to Gramscian counter-
hegemonic movements and the Foucauldian practitioner of counter-conduct, that is, an auto-
deconstructionist actor committed to viewing her own subjecthood, as well as her concrete 
interventions,2 as a site of political struggle. 
The paper begins by providing a brief overview of the prevailing Gramscian and Foucauldian 
approaches to the study of resistance, specifically as regards their respective framings of the subject 
or agent of resistance. Having provided this contextualisation, the discussion then turns to 
developing an account of the ways in which deconstruction provides salient means by which a form 
of resistance more resistant to its cooptation into forms of global ordering might function, drawing 
directly from Derrida's texts as well as from the work of scholars who utilise his thought. The paper 
finally turns to the crucial question of the concrete consequences of such a deconstructive mode of 
political resistance; countering the well-rehearsed charges that deconstruction is of significance only 
at the level of the philosophical or metaphysical (a claim which vastly underestimates the degree to 
which theory and practice—thought and action—are profoundly intertwined), a discussion of some 
of the substantive praxiological implications of deconstruction at the level of concrete intervention is 
provided via a brief engagement with feminist, queer, and post-colonial political sites. The core claim 
made in the paper is that inasmuch as deconstruction attempts to interrupt forms of thinking and 
knowing right up to and including processes of conscious and unconscious subjectification, it can 
provide valuable means by which the micro-gestures of onto-politics can be resisted at the 
(fundamentally interrelated) levels of both thought and concrete praxis. Challenging the limitations 
of both a Gramscian and Foucauldian reading of the subject or agent of resistance, it is argued that 
deconstruction can help one conceptualise modes of subject-becoming and political intervention 
which both take seriously their own indefensibility and violence in the context of a post-foundational 
political landscape and insist upon active and interventionary, if ultimately indefensible and 
therefore explicitly politicised, forms of radical praxis. 
 
Conceptualising Deconstruction as a form of Political Resistance 
Amongst other differences, what divides the prevailing Gramscian and Foucauldian approaches to 
the study of resistance in global politics is their respective accounts of the subject of resistance, the 
persons or groups conceptualised as the agents of dissent. The former, Catherine Eschle and Bice 
MaiguashĐa suggest, has pƌoĐeeded ďǇ ͚[d]eploǇiŶg the ĐoŶĐept of ͞soĐial ŵoǀeŵeŶts͟ oƌ ͞foƌĐes͟ 
aŶd situatiŶg theŵ iŶ the ƌealŵ of ͞Điǀil soĐietǇ͟'. These aĐtoƌs, they continue, are characterised as 
͚ĐouŶteƌ-hegemonic' to the extent that they reflect a collective will and seek to overturn 
class forms of oppression. We suggest that, for Gramscians, such movements embody 
alliances of diverse forces which transcend different ways of being and understanding, unite 
distinct realms of subjectivity around the interests of subordinated classes and reflect 
shared truths and goals. (2007, p. 292) 
In Gramscian approaches, in other words, the subject of resistance is presented as more or less 
united collective social and political groupings, which intervene to pursue their interests in the 
political sphere. 
This conceptualisation of the subject of dissent has been challenged by, amongst others, James C. 
Scott in his articulation of iŶfƌapolitiĐal ƌesistaŶĐes ͚ǁhiĐh fall shoƌt of opeŶlǇ deĐlaƌed ĐoŶtestatioŶ͛ 
;MittleŵaŶ & ChiŶ, ϮϬϬϱ, p. ϮϮͿ, ‘olaŶd Bleikeƌ ǀia his eǆaŵiŶatioŶ of ͚Ŷetǁoƌks of aŶti-disĐipliŶe͛ 
aŶd ͚eǀeƌǇdaǇ foƌŵs of ƌesistaŶĐe͛ ;ϮϬϬϬ, p. ϮϬϬͿ aŶd aŶaƌĐhist-inspired engagements with a range 
of contemporary resistance movements (Day, 2004; Rossdale, 2010). Similarly, scholars drawing 
eǆpliĐitlǇ oŶ FouĐault, EsĐhle aŶd MaiguashĐa suggest, haǀe ǀoiĐed suspiĐioŶ of the ͚eƌasuƌes 
entailed in narratives of identity and unity', eŵphasisiŶg iŶstead ͚the tƌaŶsitoƌǇ aŶd ĐoŶtiŶgeŶt 
Ŷatuƌe of aĐtiǀist politiĐs', aŶd ͚esĐheǁ[iŶg] the teƌŵ ͚soĐial ŵoǀeŵeŶt' iŶ faǀouƌ of ĐoŶĐepts seeŶ as 
less hoŵogeŶisiŶg'. IŵpoƌtaŶtlǇ, theǇ Ŷote, fƌoŵ suĐh a FouĐauldiaŶ ǀaŶtage poiŶt, ͚theƌe is Ŷo 
unified subject performing acts of resistance; rather resistance acts are constitutive of an always 
iŶĐoŵplete suďjeĐt͛ ;ϮϬϬϳ, p. ϮϵϮͿ. At stake iŶ this deďate is the ƋuestioŶ of the Đoŵpleǆities aŶd 
complicities of the subject or agent of resistance; the Gramscian framing of an oppositional relation 
of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forces both homogenises actors within resistance movements 
and underestimates the implications of their embeddedness within power relations. While it concurs 
with this Foucauldian critique, this paper suggests that a turn to Derrida's thought can provide 
avenues which help resist the reinscription of resistance back into forms of global ordering which the 
former cannot. 
Derrida's thought enjoys considerable influence in the critical literature within the discipline of 
Global Politics. The many ways in which it is of significance for the study of the political have been 
elucidated at length by, amongst others, Arfi (2012), Bulley (2009, 2007, pp. 128–142), Campbell 
(1998a, 1998b), Dillon (2007, pp. 80–96, 2010, pp. 191–207, 2013), Edkins (1999, pp. 65–86, 2007, 
pp. 172–192), Fagan (2013), Hirst (2013a, pp. 120–197, 2013b), O'Callaghan (2012), Pinkerton 
(2012), Vaughan-Williams (2007), and Zehfuss (2002, pp. 196–249, 2007, pp. 97–111, 2009). It is not, 
accordingly, the intention of this paper to set out an extensive overview of the fundamentals of 
deconstruction or Derrida's oeuvre more broadly. Instead, the aim here is to respond to the specific 
problem of the reappropriation of resistance back into the folds of global ordering, or, more 
properly, to demonstrate how this reinscription of resistance might itself be resisted, utilising 
elements of Derrida's thought. 
The question of such reinscription has played a central role in the ongoing debates which ensued 
following the events of 1968 between leftist movements of various denominations, both within and 
beyond the academy. Deconstruction has been widely criticised in these exchanges, not least for its 
apparent failure to provide a concrete platform from which an actor or agent may enact political 
interventions; the charge levelled has been that in undermining the political, ethical, and ontological 
foundations assumed to be necessary for radical intervention, deconstruction leads to 
immobilisation, acquiescence to the status quo, and/or relativism and nihilism. Pragmatists like 
Richard Rorty, for instance, have argued that deconstruction has 
done little for leftist politics. On the contrary, by diverting attention from real politics, it has 
helped create a self-satisfied and insular academic left which—like the left of the 1960s—
prides itself on not being co-opted by the system and thereby renders itself less able to 
improve the system. (1996, p.15) 
Similarly, many associated with the Marxian tradition, such as Terry Eagleton, have accused 
pƌaĐtitioŶeƌs of deĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ of iŶdulgiŶg iŶ a foƌŵ of ďouƌgeois jouissaŶĐe iŶ ǁhiĐh ͚politiĐal 
Ƌuietisŵ aŶd Đoŵpƌoŵise aƌe pƌeseƌǀed͛ as a ĐoŶseƋueŶĐe of ͚a dispeƌsal of the suďjeĐt so ƌadiĐal as 
to ƌeŶdeƌ it iŵpoteŶt as aŶǇ kiŶd of ageŶt at all, least of all a ƌeǀolutioŶaƌǇ oŶe͛ ;ϭϵϴϭ, pp. ϭϯϳ–138). 
In such readings, deconstruction quickly slips back into propping up the status quo by removing any 
defensible platform from which to enact resistance. 
Eagleton's critique provides, however, a useful platform from which to begin to elucidate an 
alternative account of deconstruction in which it can be viewed as having purchase in the context of 
political resistance. On the one hand, deconstruction can, he argues, be read as an 
extraordinarily modest proposal: a sort of patient, probing reformism of the text, which is 
not, so to speak, to be confronted over the barricades but cunningly waylaid in the corridors 
and suavely chivvied into revealing its ideological hand. Stoically convinced of the 
unbreakable grip of metaphysical closure, the deconstructionist, like any responsible trade 
union bureaucrat confronting management, must settle for that and negotiate what he or 
she can within the left-overs and stray contingencies casually unabsorbed by the textual 
power system. (1981, p. 134) 
In this reading, deconstruction's interventionary potential is limited in advance because the 
metaphysical structures and strictures characteristic of Western political thought and praxis leave 
only the possibility of surface-leǀel ƌefoƌŵ. DeƌiǀiŶg fƌoŵ aŶd ƌepƌoduĐiŶg the ͚ďleŶd of euphoƌia 
aŶd disillusioŶŵeŶt, liďeƌatioŶ aŶd dissipatioŶ, ĐaƌŶiǀal aŶd Đatastƌophe, ǁhiĐh ǁas ϭϵϲϴ͛, post-
structuralism in general, according to EagletoŶ, fouŶd itself uŶaďle to ͚ďƌeak the stƌuĐtuƌes of state 
poǁeƌ͛, aŶd tuƌŶed iŶstead to the task of ͚suďǀeƌtiŶg the stƌuĐtuƌes of laŶguage͛ ;ϭϵϵϲ, p. ϭϮϯͿ. 
What eŶsues iŶ the Đase of deĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ iŶ paƌtiĐulaƌ, he Đlaiŵs, is that ͚the Maoist ͞Đultuƌal 
reǀolutioŶ͟ is ŶaiǀelǇ tƌaŶsplaŶted to the aƌeŶa of laŶguage, so that politiĐal ƌeǀolutioŶ ďeĐoŵes 
iŵpliĐitlǇ eƋuated ǁith soŵe Đeaseless disƌuptioŶ aŶd oǀeƌtuƌŶiŶg͛ ;ϭϵϵϭ, p. ϭϵϳͿ. The ultiŵate 
consequence of this is a process of emptying out of both the subject and object of political thought; 
Anglo-AŵeƌiĐaŶ deĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ aŵouŶts, foƌ EagletoŶ, to ͚a poǁeƌ gaŵe, a ŵiƌƌoƌ-image of 
oƌthodoǆ aĐadeŵiĐ ĐoŵpetitioŶ. It is just that Ŷoǁ … ǀiĐtoƌǇ is aĐhieǀed ďǇ keŶosis oƌ self-emptying: 
the winner is the one who has ŵaŶaged to get ƌid of all his Đaƌds aŶd sit ǁith eŵptǇ haŶds͛ ;ϭϵϵϲ, p. 
ϭϮϳͿ. The iŵpliĐatioŶ of this is that deĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ ͚pƌaĐtiĐes a ŵode of self-destruction that leaves it 
as invulnerable as an empty page. As such, it merely rehearses in different terms a gesture common 
to all ideologǇ: it atteŵpts to ǀaŶƋuish its aŶtagoŶist ǁhile leaǀiŶg itself uŶsĐathed͛ ;ϭϵϴϭ, p. ϭϯϲͿ. 
Such a process offers little by way of politicised intervention. 
On the other hand, however, Eagleton suggests that to frame it as such 
ignores the other fact of deconstruction which is its hair-raising radicalism – the nerve and 
daring with which it knocks the stuffing out of every smug concept and leaves the well-
groomed text shamefully dishevelled. It ignores, in short, the madness and violence of 
deconstruction, its scandalous urge to think the unthinkable, the flamboyance with which it 
poses itself on the very brink of meaning and dances there, pounding away at the crumbling 
cliff-edge beneath its feet and prepared to fall with it into the sea of unlimited semiosis or 
schizophrenia. (1981, p. 134, emphases in original) 
“uĐh aŶ iŶteƌǀeŶtioŶ is, foƌ EagletoŶ, ͚ultƌa-leftist͛; ďeĐause ͚teǆts͛, uŶdeƌstood as ďoth ǁƌitteŶ 
artefacts and concrete socio-politiĐal ĐoŶfiguƌatioŶs, aƌe ͚poǁeƌ sǇsteŵs͛, the deconstructionist 
͚ŵust tƌaĐk a Đat-and-mouse game within and across them without ever settling for either signifier 
oƌ sigŶified͛ ;ϭϵϴϭ, p. ϭϯϰͿ. IŶ this ƌeadiŶg, deĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ's ƌadiĐalisŵ ĐoŶsists iŶ its ĐapaĐitǇ to 
substantively and tirelessly interrupt prevailing conceptual and praxiological modes of operating. In 
Deƌƌida's ǁoƌds, the effeĐt of this is to iŶstigate ͚the suďǀeƌsioŶ of eǀeƌǇ kiŶgdoŵ. WhiĐh ŵakes it 
obviously threatening and infallibly dreaded by everything within us that desires a kiŶgdoŵ͛ ;Đited iŶ 
Bowman, 2010, p. 39). Amongst other things, what such a response poses is the question of what it 
is iŶ ͚us͛ that seeks suĐh a staďle oƌ defeŶsiďle platfoƌŵ fƌoŵ ǁhiĐh to eŶaĐt politiĐal iŶteƌǀeŶtioŶ. 
What is interesting about this dual framing is that it points to the possibility, on the one hand, that 
deconstruction, read as the continuous reflection upon, and evaluation of, norms, assumptions, and 
principles, is not really a big ask; any critical position worthy of the name should be engaging in 
reflexive auto-critique as a matter of course in order to respond to its inevitable shortcomings, 
exclusions, and oversights. On the other hand, the radicalism of deconstruction, Eagleton shows, 
consists in the scope, depth, and endurance of such auto-critique. Far from simply an isolated 
instance or contained process, deconstruction is interminable, never ceasing, and insists that no 
claim, assumption, or principle is to be viewed as given or unproblematic, no matter how apparently 
praiseworthy. Even as political interventions are conceptualised and performed, a deconstructive 
engagement insists upon reflecting again, challenging again the grounds upon which an action was 
taken, and making any certitude of one's correctness ultimately impossible. As will be shown below, 
hoǁeǀeƌ, the aďseŶĐe of suĐh ͚ĐoƌƌeĐtŶess͛ is iŶ ŵaŶǇ ǁaǇs a salutaƌǇ, as opposed to deďilitatiŶg, 
political moment. 
This raises a second important question, namely that of the animating drive or momentum of 
deconstruction; if the grounds upon which one can base a political intervention have been 
fundamentally shaken, it is legitimate to ask what is it that animates deconstruction's ceaseless 
movements. On the one hand, both Derrida and many utilising his thought suggest that 
deconstruction can be described as always already in motion due to its relation to an 
uŶdeĐoŶstƌuĐtaďle otheƌŶess to ǁhiĐh oŶe is alǁaǇs alƌeadǇ ƌespoŶsiďle: ͚OŶĐe Ǉou ƌelate to the 
otheƌ as the otheƌ, theŶ soŵethiŶg iŶĐalĐulaďle Đoŵes oŶ the sĐeŶe… That is ǁhat gives 
deĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ its ŵoǀeŵeŶt͛ ;ϮϬϬϲ, pp. ϭϳ–18). Derrida frames this as springing from a relation to 
justiĐe: ͚JustiĐe is ǁhat giǀes us the iŵpulse, the dƌiǀe, oƌ the ŵoǀeŵeŶt to iŵpƌoǀe the laǁ, that is, 
to deĐoŶstƌuĐt the laǁ͛ ;ϮϬϬϲ, p. ϭϲͿ. IŶ otheƌ ǁoƌds, deĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ fiŶds ͚its ͞foƌĐe, its ŵoǀeŵeŶt 
oƌ its ŵotiǀatioŶ͟ iŶ the ͞alǁaǇs uŶsatisfied appeal͟ to justiĐe͛ ;BoǁŵaŶ, ϮϬϭϬ, pp. ϰϯ–44, citing 
Protevi). Such momentum is similarly framed by John Caputo in terms of a faith (2006, p. 165), or a 
͚Ŷameless love' (2006, p. 173). The imperative that emanates from this relation to otherness is, 
Derrida suggests elsewhere, so significant that no other authoring force of deconstruction is 
ŶeĐessaƌǇ: ͚the iŶsisteŶĐe oŶ uŶďiŶdiŶg…, oŶ the iƌƌeduĐiďilitǇ of difference is so massive as to need 
Ŷo fuƌtheƌ iŶsisteŶĐe͛ ;ϭϵϵϴ, p. ϮϳͿ. The apoƌia uŶdeƌpiŶŶiŶg deĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ, he aƌgues, ͚is just ǁhat 
impels deconstruction, what rouses it out of bed in the morning, what drives it on and calls it into 
aĐtioŶ͛ ;ϮϬϬϲ, p. 32). 
Whether framed as emanating from an always unsatisfied appeal to justice, faith, love, or aporia, 
ǁhat these aĐĐouŶts shaƌe is the seŶse that deĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ ͚happeŶs͛ as a ĐoŶseƋueŶĐe of the 
ƌelatioŶ to otheƌŶess, that the authoƌisiŶg foƌĐe ͚is͛ this relation. This is, perhaps, the deconstruction 
of the ͚to Đoŵe͛, the deĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ assoĐiated ǁith the ŵessiaŶiĐ pƌoŵise ŵade ŵost eǆpliĐit iŶ 
Deƌƌida's lateƌ ǁoƌk; iŶ Caputo's fƌaŵiŶg, the ͚iŵpoƌt aŶd the iŵpulse, the dƌiǀe aŶd desiƌe of 
deconstruction is not cognitive or constative but performative; deconstruction is not matter of 
kŶoǁiŶg oƌ seeiŶg, ďut of ďelieǀiŶg…[,] dƌiǀeŶ ďǇ a faith iŶ the iŵpossiďle aŶd uŶdeĐoŶstƌuĐtiďle͛ 
(2006, p. 166). 
In contrast to this, on the other hand, Derrida and numerous scholars employing his ideas frame 
deconstruction as requiring a more explicit and deliberate intervention on the part of an actor or 
suďjeĐt. IŶ BoǁŵaŶ's fƌaŵiŶg, deĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ ͚has Ŷo poǁeƌ of its oǁŶ͛ ;ϮϬϭϬ, p. ϯϴͿ. Deƌƌida 
similarly states that far fƌoŵ siŵplǇ ͚happeŶiŶg͛, deĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ ŵust ďe eŶaĐted: ͚deĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ is 
͞Ǉes͟, is liŶked to the ͞Ǉes͟, is aŶ affiƌŵatioŶ͛ ;Đited iŶ Caputo, ϮϬϬϲ, p. ϮϳͿ.ϯ As suĐh, aŶ aĐtiǀe 
effort on the part of an agent is assumed; rather than springing solely from a relation to otherness, 
deconstruction is an interventionary process requiring constant work. Far from it occurring 
spontaneously as a consequence of the relation to otherness, one must try to find, for instance, the 
heterogeneity in texts (Derrida, 2006, p. ϵͿ. This ŶeĐessitates aŶ ͚iŶĐessaŶt ǀigilaŶĐe aďout the dooƌs 
that aƌe ĐoŶstaŶtlǇ ďeiŶg shut ďǇ the ͞possiďle͛͟ ;Caputo, ϮϬϬϲ, p. ϭϯϰͿ; as suĐh it ƌelies oŶ aŶ 
endless series of interventions on the part of an actor, a ceaseless resistance to the ever-present 
appropriations of the onto-political. 
This is crucial in the context of resistance because it is precisely the commitment made on the part 
of the subject which makes possible the resistances deconstruction pertains to. To rely on the 
assumption that deĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ siŵplǇ ͚happeŶs͛ ǁithiŶ the teǆt, oĐĐuƌs spoŶtaŶeouslǇ as a 
consequence of a relation to otherness, profoundly underestimates the struggle required to attempt 
to ceaselessly resist the micro-disciplinary ensnarements of the onto-political at intertwined levels of 
thought and the concrete political sphere. It further underemphasises the degree to which 
deconstruction is itself a violent and even fraught enterprise: in Derrida's words, deconstruction 
iŶǀolǀes a ͚suffeƌaŶĐe': ͚ǁhat ŵakes it suffer and what makes those it torments suffer is perhaps the 
absence of rules, of norms, of definitive criteria that would allow one to distinguish unequivocally 
ďetǁeeŶ dƌoit aŶd justiĐe͛ ;ϭϵϵϮ, p. ϰͿ. 
I would argue that this latter reading of deconstruction as interwoven with struggle, experienced 
through the violence of the indefensible, is of much greater value in the context of conceptualising 
resistance than is the former messianic vision; as I and others have argued elsewhere (Hirst, 2013b; 
Houseman, 2ϬϭϯͿ, iŶsofaƌ as the ͚death of God͛ϰ pƌeĐludes the possiďilitǇ of aŶ authoƌiŶg ͚Alteƌ͛, aŶd 
the horrors of Auschwitz and countless past and contemporary political violences situate the beatific 
hopefulness of the messianic promise beyond the bounds even of irony, such a promise is 
problematic at best. It may be that such a messianic framing of deconstruction informs Eagleton's 
iŵpoƌtaŶt ĐhalleŶge that, ͚iŶ a ǁoƌld gƌoaŶiŶg iŶ agoŶǇ, ǁheƌe the ǀeƌǇ futuƌe of huŵaŶkiŶd haŶgs 
by a hair, there is something objeĐtioŶaďlǇ luǆuƌious aďout deĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ͛ ;ϭϵϴϭ, p. ϭϰϬͿ. “iŵplǇ 
put, one cannot wait for deconstruction to simply unfold before one's eyes; the urgency of the 
political demands an active, even fraught mode of engagement, in which the subject or agent 
proceeds with her own irredeemable violence in the forefront of her account of herself in a bid to 
write and rewrite herself anew in light of the political landscape encountered. Accordingly, the paper 
now turns to Derrida's thought in order to develop an account of how such a deconstructive mode of 
resistance might function. 
 
Derrida and Political Resistance 
While Derrida's oeuvre is vast, explicit references to the concept of resistance are few. The account 
of a deconstructive mode of resistance provided here, accordingly, focuses primarily on the works in 
which the issue is most directly addressed. In Resistances of Psychoanalysis, Derrida begins his 
aĐĐouŶt of the ĐoŶĐept of ƌesistaŶĐe ďǇ ŵaƌkiŶg his loǀe of the sigŶifieƌ: ͚Eǀeƌ siŶĐe I ĐaŶ ƌeŵeŵďeƌ, 
I have always loved this word'. He continues: 
This ǁoƌd… ƌesoŶated iŶ ŵǇ desiƌe aŶd ŵǇ iŵagiŶatioŶ as the ŵost ďeautiful ǁoƌd iŶ the 
politics and history of this country, this word loaded with all the pathos of my nostalgia, as if, 
at any cost, I would like not to have missed blowing up trains, tanks, and headquarters 
ďetǁeeŶ ϭϵϰϬ aŶd ϭϵϰϱ… WhǇ haǀe I alǁaǇs dƌeaŵed of ƌesistaŶĐe? ;Deƌƌida, ϭϵϵϴ, p. ϮͿϱ 
Paul Bowman takes up this question of why one might dream of resistance, noting a number of 
potential dangers assoĐiated ǁith the ĐoŶĐept. He ideŶtifies, fiƌst, a ŽižekiaŶ ƌeadiŶg iŶ ǁhiĐh 
͚͞politiĐs͟ aŶd ͞ƌesistaŶĐe͟ ŵight ďe ƌegaƌded as aliďis ĐoǀeƌiŶg a dƌiǀe to ƌepeat ĐeƌtaiŶ gestuƌes 
;suĐh as ͞politiĐiziŶg͟ oƌ ͞seekiŶg ƌesistaŶĐe͟Ϳ ƌatheƌ thaŶ aŶǇthiŶg like aŶ ͞autheŶtiĐ͟ desiƌe to 
ŵake a ĐhaŶge͛ ;ϮϬϭϬ, p. ϰϳ. Eŵphasis iŶ oƌigiŶalͿ. “uĐh a dƌiǀe has ŵoƌe to do ǁith the geŶeƌatioŶ 
of particular forms of jouissance than it does substantive political intervention. 
Bowman similarly notes the pessimism of Baudrillard aŶd AdoƌŶo, ďoth of ǁhoŵ ŵight take ͚the 
possibility of an intimate intertwining or wedlock between power and resistance to mean that 
oppositioŶal ƌesistaŶĐe peƌ se is ͞alǁaǇs alƌeadǇ Ŷegated ďǇ the stƌuĐtuƌe of the eŶtitǇ ǁhiĐh it 
ǁishes to oppose͛͟ ;ϮϬϭ0, p. 48, citing Docherty, 1993, p. 322). It is easy, he continues, to move from 
this positioŶ to the ĐoŶĐlusioŶ of Bouƌdieu aŶd WaĐƋuaŶt that ͚the ǀeƌǇ idea of ƌesistaŶĐe… is siŵplǇ 
a fetish concept which demonstrates a profound misrecognition and delusion of the part of those 
ǁho ͞ďuǇ iŶto it͛͟; iŶ this ƌeadiŶg, ͚dƌeaŵs of ƌesistaŶĐe aƌe ƌeallǇ oŶlǇ ƌesistaŶt dƌeaŵs. Those 
involved in cultural theory may (claim to) dream of resistance, but that doesn't mean that anything is 
actually being resisted. ClaimiŶg to ƌesist is Ŷot ŶeĐessaƌilǇ to ƌesist͛ ;ϮϬϭϬ, p. ϰϵ, eŵphases iŶ 
oƌigiŶalͿ. Deƌƌida is, of Đouƌse, ŵiŶdful of this: iŶ BoǁŵaŶ's teƌŵs, Deƌƌida shoǁs that ͚eǀeŶ 
resistance organised by explicit appeal to the idea of (its own) freedom may not be free or self-
determining and may instead be entirely overdetermined, symptomatic—possibly even more an 
expression of the power that is ostensibly being resisted than something independently resistant or 
alter-Ŷatiǀe͛ ;ϮϬϭϬ, p. ϰϴ. Eŵphasis iŶ oƌigiŶalͿ. Neǀeƌtheless, Derrida risks elucidating his self-
ideŶtified ͚idioŵatiĐ͛, eǀeŶ ͚idiosǇŶĐƌatiĐ͛, iŶteƌest iŶ the ĐoŶĐept of ƌesistaŶĐe iŶ the ĐoŶteǆt of 
psychoanalytic theory. 
PsǇĐhoaŶalǇsis, Deƌƌida suggests, ĐaŶ ďe uŶdeƌstood as ͚aŶalǇsis of ƌesistaŶĐe͛ iŶsofaƌ as the 
manifestations of resistance enacted both consciously and unconsciously by the analysand to the 
treatment offered by the analyst lay bare the limitations of, and violences immanent to, the latter. In 
his exploration of Freud's commentary on the problem of resistance to psychoanalysis, he is 
ĐoŶĐeƌŶed, iŶ his ǁoƌds, ͚ǁith soŵethiŶg otheƌ thaŶ aŶalǇsis, a ĐeƌtaiŶ aŶalǇsis, soŵethiŶg that, iŶ 
aŶotheƌ seŶse, peƌhaps, ƌesists aŶalǇsis, a ĐeƌtaiŶ aŶalǇsis͛ ;ϭϵϵϴ, p. ϱͿ. Deƌƌida tƌaĐes this 
͚soŵethiŶg otheƌ͛ through a series of different forms of resistance to psychoanalysis; he shows that 
Freud identified five distinct registers at which resistance operates, which emanate variously from 
the ego, the id, and the superego, but suggests that the most enduring and resilient resistances are 
associated with the repetition compulsion and function at the level of the unconscious (1998, p. 23). 
This ͚soŵethiŶg otheƌ͛ ǁhiĐh pƌoŵpts suĐh ƌesistaŶĐes is ƌead ďǇ Deƌƌida as iŶteƌƌuptiŶg 
psychoanalysis's claim to internal coherence, self-sameness, and reasonableness. This is because it 
transpires that the only means by which resistances can be finally overcome are non-rational, 
affective, and emotive; in Andrea Hurst's framing, Freud 
acknowledges that resistances can be nonrational, which means that struggles against them 
haǀe to ŵoďilize foƌĐes otheƌ thaŶ those of ƌatioŶal eŶlighteŶŵeŶt… IŶ otheƌ ǁoƌds, to 
persuade analysands to accept interpretations, analysts are required to capitalize on the 
eŵotioŶal dǇŶaŵiĐs of a ͚poleƌos', that is, the polemics and erotics of resistance, power, and 
authoƌitǇ … ;ϮϬϬϴ, p. ϭϳϮͿ 
It is this ͚soŵethiŶg otheƌ͛ that ĐoŶŶeĐts the ŶotioŶ of ƌesistaŶĐe to the ŵoǀeŵeŶts of 
deconstruction. Just as this force sabotages the imposition of order and stability of narrative on the 
part of the analyst in the context of psychoanalysis, so too does the deconstructive imperative resist 
the instantiation of totality in the sphere of the onto-political. Oliver Marchart describes something 
similar in his framing of the distiŶĐtioŶ ďetǁeeŶ ͚politiĐs', uŶdeƌstood as a paƌtiĐulaƌ set of 
instantiated socio-politiĐal aƌƌaŶgeŵeŶts, aŶd ͚the politiĐal͛, uŶdeƌstood as soŵethiŶg otheƌ ǁhiĐh 
inexorably exceeds and disrupts these forms of ordering as a consequence of the exclusions and 
ǀioleŶĐes of aŶǇ ĐoŶfiguƌatioŶ of ͚politiĐs͛ ;ϮϬϬϳͿ. 
The Ŷatuƌe of this saďotagiŶg ͚soŵethiŶg otheƌ͛ at ǁoƌk iŶ ďoth ƌesistaŶĐe to psǇĐhoaŶalǇsis aŶd a 
deconstructive political ethos can be discerned through an elucidation of the relationship between 
Foucault's and Derrida's respective approaches to resistance. For Foucault, as Jenny Edkins and 
Veronique Pin-Fat shoǁ, ͚ƌelatioŶs of poǁeƌ eŶtail ƌesistaŶĐe: theǇ ǁould Ŷot ĐouŶt as ƌelatioŶs of 
poǁeƌ ǁeƌe ƌesistaŶĐe Ŷot pƌeseŶt͛ ;ϮϬϬϰ, p. ϱͿ. As suĐh, resistance is immanent to the structures of 
global order for Foucault in a manner not dissimilar to Derrida's identification of a resistant 
͚soŵethiŶg otheƌ͛ alǁaǇs alƌeadǇ at ǁoƌk ǁithiŶ psǇĐhoaŶalǇsis; iŶ ďoth aĐĐouŶts, ƌesistaŶĐe is 
contained within and always already part of the relational ordering processes at work. 
Similarly, Foucault and Derrida share in certain respects a commitment to genealogy as a mode of 
ƌesistaŶĐe. AĐĐoƌdiŶg to ‘olaŶd Bleikeƌ, geŶealogies ͚tƌaĐe the pƌoĐesses ďǇ ǁhiĐh ǁe haǀe come to 
aĐĐept ouƌ ǁoƌld as Ŷatuƌal oƌ ŵeaŶiŶgful͛; theǇ aƌe 
historical investigations into the ideas and events that have shaped our thinking, speaking 
aŶd aĐtiŶg… [TheǇ] foĐus oŶ the pƌoĐess ďǇ ǁhiĐh ǁe haǀe ĐoŶstƌuĐted oƌigiŶs aŶd giǀeŶ 
meaning to particular representations of the past, representations that continuously guide 
our daily lives and set clear limits to political and social options. 
GeŶealogies thus eŶaĐt ƌesistaŶĐe ďeĐause ͚ƋuestioŶs of ageŶĐǇ aƌe aďoǀe all ƋuestioŶs of poǁeƌ 
relations. And power relations are best understood, Michel Foucault argues convincingly, by 
eǆaŵiŶiŶg speĐifiĐ atteŵpts that aƌe ŵade to upƌoot theŵ͛ ;ϮϬϬϬ, pp. Ϯϱ–26). Differently put, what 
is suggested here is that by conducting a genealogical exploration into specific configurations of 
power relations via an examination of forms of dissent, the political fault lines inherent to such 
relations are exposed and thereby (potentially or actually) challenged. Such forms of counter-writing 
can provide alternative accounts of particular power relations which expose and address the 
hierarchies, silences, and exclusions of prevailing historical and contemporary socio-political 
arrangements, and these can be used to conceptualise interventions intended to resist them. 
Deconstruction shares with Foucauldian genealogy a commitment to such conceptual and concrete 
distuƌďaŶĐes: iŶ Deƌƌida's ǁoƌds, deĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ is ͚alǁaǇs a ŵatteƌ of uŶdoiŶg, desediŵeŶtiŶg, 
decomposing, deconstituting sediments, artefacta, presuppositions, institutions'. To this degree, he 
eǆplaiŶs, deĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ ŵaǇ ďe ƌead as a ͚ĐƌitiĐo-geŶealogiĐal ƌetuƌŶ͛ ;ϭϵϵϴ, p. Ϯϳ. Eŵphases iŶ 
oƌigiŶalͿ. DeĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ, he Đlaiŵs, folloǁs the logiĐ of the dual ŵeaŶiŶg of the ǁoƌd ͚aŶalǇsis͛: it 
͚uŶdeŶiaďlǇ oďeǇs aŶ aŶalǇtiĐal exigency, at once critical and analytic'. What emerges, he continues, 
is ďoth aŶ ͚aƌĐheologiĐal oƌ aŶagogiĐal ŵotif… aŶd the philolǇtiĐ ŵotif of the dissoĐiatiǀe—always 
very close to the saying dis-social—uŶďiŶdiŶg͛ ;ϭϵϵϴ, p. Ϯϳ. Eŵphases iŶ oƌigiŶalͿ. IŶ other words, 
what Derrida identifies here is the dimension of deconstruction which shares a good deal with 
genealogy's commitment to an excavation and reinterpretation of the past and/or present in a 
manner which intervenes so as to denaturalise dominant social understandings and forces. 
At this stage, hoǁeǀeƌ, Deƌƌida appeŶds a footŶote ǁhiĐh stipulates that ͚the ŶeĐessitǇ of this 
geŶealogǇ ŵust alǁaǇs ďe ĐoŵpliĐated ďǇ a ͚ĐouŶteƌ-genealogy'. Simple genealogy always risks 
privileging the archeo-genetic motif, or even the at least symbolic schema of filiation, family, or 
ŶatioŶal oƌigiŶ͛ ;ϭϵϵϴ, Ŷ. ϴ, p. ϭϮϬͿ. While I ǁould Ŷot use the ǁoƌd ͚siŵple͛ iŶ the ĐoŶteǆt of 
Foucault's genealogical interventions, Derrida's comment highlights a crucial issue at stake in 
processes of counter-writing and counter-ĐoŶduĐt. IŶ his ǁoƌds, deĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ ͚ƌadiĐalizes at the 
saŵe tiŵe its aǆioŵatiĐs aŶd the ĐƌitiƋue of its aǆioŵatiĐs'. What this eŶtails is ͚a ŵoǀeŵeŶt of 
deconstruction that is not only counter-archeological but counter-geŶealogiĐal'. This is ďeĐause ͚the 
deconstructive necessity drives one to put into question even this principle of self-presence in the 
unity of consciousness', (1998, pp. 27–28. Emphasis in original) upon which the construction of a 
genealogy depends. In other words, through deconstruction, critique extends not only to the object 
or issue prompting the initial genealogical re-writing but also, at the same time, to both any 
alternative story told and, indeed, the author or subject of any such alternative narrative. 
The extension of critique to such second- and third-order sites is necessary because however 
apparently politically laudable the intervention, one cannot engage in a project of genealogical 
counter-writing or counter-conduct without enacting a privileging of a particular subject position 
and, consequently, a necessarily violent rendering of the objects in question. As such, as Paul Patton 
Ŷotes, geŶealogǇ ŵaǇ thus ďe ƌead as a ͚fiƌst step' iŶ deĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ ;ϮϬϬϳ, p. ϳϲϴͿ, ďut ďeǇoŶd this 
first-order engagement, both the alternative account provided and the agent herself must also be 
put into question. This is because any alternative history or conceptual apparatus as such risks 
becoming its own totalising gesture, one as problematic as the last; the intention is to resist the 
possibility that the critico-genealogical intervention itself becomes consolidated into a new 
prevailing account, as blind as was the last to its own exclusions, hierarchies, and violences. This 
gesture adds, I would submit, a further radical intervention which genealogy alone cannot provide. 
Michael Dillon suggests something similar in his statement that an interrogation of the politics of 
security 
requires something in addition to genealogy as well; because genealogy, however politicising 
it might be – Foucault arguing, powerfully, that this politicising takes place for, or rather 
aƌouŶd, the ďattle oǀeƌ tƌuth as ͚the eŶseŵďle of ƌules aĐĐoƌdiŶg to ǁhiĐh the tƌue aŶd the 
false are separated and specific effects of power attached to the true' – does not directly 
pose and seek to think the question of the political as such. (1996, p. 22) 
Without an accompanying series of counter-genealogical interruptions, any genealogy proffered, in 
other words, is implicated in precisely the politics of ontological totalisation and closure which 
underpin the historical or political phenomena genealogical counter-writing seeks to challenge. In 
attending to these second- and third-level critiques—of the alternative narrative and the narrator, 
respectively—deconstruction thus enacts a further form of onto-political resistance. This neither 
serves to undermine or destroy such interventions, nor does it entail the immobilisation of the 
subject; rather, it insists upon critique and reflexivity at the same moment as political interventions 
are being constructed and enacted. 
In insisting on these second- and third-order critiques in addition to the original act of counter-
ǁƌitiŶg, deĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ ĐaŶ ďe fƌaŵed as a ͚pƌiŶĐiple of iŶteƌŵiŶaďle aŶalysis: an axiom of 
iŶteƌŵiŶaďilitǇ, peƌhaps͛ ;Deƌƌida, ϭϵϵϴ, p. ϯϯͿ. “iŵplǇ put, the deĐoŶstƌuĐtiǀe iŵpeƌatiǀe aŵouŶts 
to a commitment to disrupting processes of conceptual or ontological unification wherever they 
occur, whether within institutions of global ordering or within one's own discourse; for Derrida, if 
theƌe ǁeƌe a sole thesis of deĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ ͚it ǁould pose diǀisiďilitǇ: diffeƌeŶĐe as diǀisiďilitǇ͛; 
ďeĐause ͚theƌe is Ŷo iŶdiǀisiďle eleŵeŶt oƌ siŵple oƌigiŶ … aŶalǇsis is iŶteƌŵiŶaďle͛ ;ϭϵϵϴ, pp. 33–
34). In its commitment to ceaselessly unpicking the apparent internal coherence of prevailing forces 
of material and conceptual ordering, which are at work within one's own attempts to enact 
resistance as much as within concrete processes of global politics, deconstruction performs a 
͚hǇpeƌaŶalǇtiĐisŵ͛: it aŵouŶts to ͚a hǇpeƌďoliĐisŵ of aŶalǇsis that takes soŵetiŵes, iŶ ĐeƌtaiŶ 
people's eǇes, the foƌŵ of hǇpeƌdiaďoliĐisŵ͛ ;ϭϵϵϴ, p. ϮϵͿ. 
Such a hyperanalytic mode of engagement is both paradoxical and crucial because, 
in order to prevent the critique of originarism in its transcendental or ontological, analytic or 
dialectical form from yielding, according to the law that we well know, to empiricism or 
positivism, it was necessary to accede, in a still more radical, more analytical fashion, to the 
traditional demand, to the very law which had just been deconstructed. (1998, p. 29) 
In other words, deconstruction paradoxically mobilises the very analytical and conceptual tools 
which it itself has already identified as divisible and deconstructible in order to challenge both these 
tools and resist the traditions of thought and praxis they derive from. For Bowman, deconstruction 
thus aŵouŶts to a pƌoĐess of ͚liteƌalisatioŶ͛; it siŵplǇ looks foƌ ͚that ǁhiĐh is Đlaiŵed oƌ assuŵed to 
be real, present, actual or true (such as the notions of presence, justice, responsibility, univocal 
truth, etc). In looking, it reveals that these are both undecidable and yet forcefully imposed, in 
ĐoŶtiŶgeŶt ĐoŶstitutioŶal foƌŵs͛ ;BoǁŵaŶ, ϮϬϭϬ, p. ϯϵͿ. But it iŶsists that suĐh lookiŶg ďe ĐoŶstantly 
undertaken both at the level of processes of global ordering and within one's own attempts to enact 
resistance to such ordering. The radicalism of such an extensive critical imperative is suggested by 
Adorno: such thought 
as such, before all particular contents, is an act of negation, of resistance to that which is 
forced upon it; this is what thought has inherited from its archetype, the relation between 
laďoƌ aŶd ŵateƌial… The effoƌt iŵplied iŶ the ĐoŶĐept of thought itself, as a ĐouŶteƌpaƌt to 
passive contemplation, is negative already – a revolt against being importuned to bow to 
every immediate thing. (2004, p. 19) 
As this suggests, the reason such second- and third-order resistances are necessary relates to the 
question of violence. 
Deconstruction attempts to render explicit and address the violence which is immanent to political 
thought and praxis as such. In Adorno's terms, 
[w]hile doing violence to the object of its synthesis, our thinking heeds a potential that waits 
in the object, and it unconsciously obeys the idea of making amends to the pieces for what it 
has doŶe… [T]he ƌesistaŶĐe of thought to ŵeƌe thiŶgs iŶ ďeiŶg, the ĐoŵŵaŶdiŶg fƌeedoŵ of 
the subject, intends in the object even that of which the object was deprived by its 
objectification. (2004, p. 19)6 
What this means is that a form of resistance which comprises second- and third-order critiques, as 
opposed to a single gesture of supposedly correct intervention, can better attend to, expose, and 
attempt to ameliorate the violent exclusions that necessarily accompany it. 
A prevailing response to such a deconstructive imperative has been to insist that radical politics 
ƌeƋuiƌes ͚ĐoŶstƌuĐtiǀe͛, positiǀe iŶteƌǀeŶtioŶs aŶd aĐtiǀities, Ŷot aŶ eŶdless piĐkiŶg apaƌt of these; as 
Noys relays, it is Đlaiŵed that ͚the ŵiĐƌo-politics of deconstruction can never pass to a constructive 
stage of ďuildiŶg oƌ ĐƌeatiŶg ƌadiĐal alteƌŶatiǀes…͛ ;ϮϬϭϮ, p. ϮϵͿ. It is assuŵed iŶ this ƌeadiŶg, iŶ 
other words, that deconstruction amounts to fruitless process of undermining intervention and a 
cyclical pattern of disruption which ultimately leads nowhere. On the contrary, however, these 
movements are precisely productive and generative of substantive political interventions; much as 
when an issue or concept is discussed in a classroom without ultimate resolution, or a text read 
which challenges one's views without offering an immediate ready solution, the consequence of a 
deconstructive engagement is not stasis and silence, but rather a sparking of fresh reflections, a 
rethinking and reimagining which itself amounts and makes possible further generative and 
productive acts, even if the ground upon which one bases such interventions has become decidedly 
shakieƌ. CoŶseƋueŶtlǇ, faƌ fƌoŵ iŶeffeĐtual, deĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ is ͚the act of taking a position, in the very 
work it does with regard to the political-institutional structures that constitute and govern our 
pƌaĐtiĐes, ouƌ ĐoŵpeteŶĐes, aŶd ouƌ peƌfoƌŵaŶĐes͛ ;Deƌƌida, Đited iŶ Elaŵ, ϭϵϵϰ, p. ϵϬͿ. It ƌeŵaiŶs 
to provide some specific examples of such deconstructive political praxis. 
 
Deconstruction as Political Praxis 
There are many manifestations of the practical consequences of deconstructive resistance across a 
range of academic disciplines and activist sites. Drawing on the work of scholars and activists who 
have explicitly linked their radical political projects to deconstruction, whether through endorsing or 
critiquing it, this section provides two accounts of deconstruction read as a form of activism, 
followed by a brief snapshot of three examples of its praxiological utility in the contexts of feminist, 
queer, and post-colonial political interventions. Crucially, I am not trying to claim for deconstruction 
the successes of these latter movements, nor am I suggesting that the actors involved by any means 
do or should self-identify as proponents of deconstruction. To do so would be a crude and colonising 
appropriation. Rather, the point made is that the movements and interventions discussed share with 
deconstruction a commitment to disrupting prevailing norms and assumptions reflective of the 
second- and third-order critiques outlined above, specifically as regards problematising essentialised 
or naturalised agents of resistance. 
One pertinent account of the concrete consequences of deconstruction is provided by Martin 
MĐQuillaŶ. He suggests it ĐaŶ ďe ĐoŶĐeptualised as a foƌŵ of ͚teǆtual aĐtiǀisŵ͛: iŶ deĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ's 
ŵoǀeŵeŶts, he aƌgues, ͚aŶ iŶteƌǀeŶtioŶ takes plaĐe ;a teǆtual aĐtiǀisŵͿ ǁhiĐh pƌoduĐes the 
movement, history and becoming of a necessary political analysis which links the political to critical 
thought todaǇ͛ ;ϮϬϬϴ, p. ϲͿ. This is ďeĐause 
deconstruction (unlike philosophy) reads. Such reading qua reading does not generalise from 
the exemplary but accepts the challenge of the exemplary to thought as an articulation of 
the troubling otherness which presents itself as an arrival in reading. Reading in this sense 
has ǀeƌǇ little to do ǁith the Ƌuiet spaĐes of uŶiǀeƌsitǇ liďƌaƌies… ‘atheƌ, this ƌeadiŶg is aŶ 
interminable, unconditional critical liveliness to the world around us, its histories and its 
futures. (2008, p. 6–7) 
In elucidating this notion of textual activism, McQuillan makes the point that deconstruction 
intervenes not simply at the level of thought or philosophy but rather in ways which have 
substantive material effects. Simply put, this is because the ways we think have a direct bearing on 
the ways we act; in the post-9/11 world, 
the stupefaction and mystification of domestic thought is inseparable from the military 
violence which is only one aspect of this world-wide struggle. Thus, critical reason and 
deconstruction are more important now than ever and this textual activism will be affiliated 
iŶ uŶpƌediĐtaďle ǁaǇs… to the ŵateƌial pƌoĐesses of the politiĐal. ;2008, p. 9) 
MĐQuillaŶ eŵphasises heƌe the eǆteŶt to ǁhiĐh ͚teǆtual͛ ƌeadiŶgs aŶd iŶteƌǀeŶtioŶs aƌe ďǇ Ŷo ŵeaŶs 
dissociable from the concrete sphere of global politics. While certainly not their sole origin or source, 
socio-political framings and discourses of war and militarism in the post-9/11 world clearly 
functioned to provide the conceptual foundations and parameters without which the justifications 
proffered by statespersons in the USA and elsewhere for the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan could 
not have been convincing or indeed intelligible. Many scholars of global politics using Derrida's 
thought have made similar points in a range of empirical contexts (Arfi, 2012; Bulley, 2009; Edkins, 
ϭϵϵϵ; FagaŶ, Gloƌieuǆ, Hašiŵďegoǀić, & “uetsugu, ϮϬϬϳ; )ehfuss, 2002). 
CoŶĐuƌƌeŶtlǇ, Paul BoǁŵaŶ fƌaŵes deĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ as a foƌŵ of ͚ŵaƌtial aƌt͛. He suggests that 
͚although Deƌƌida ŵaiŶlǇ ƌead aŶd ǁƌote ;ŵoŶstƌouslǇ faithfullǇͿ aďout ͞ŵeƌe͟ philosophiĐal teǆts, 
these teǆts aƌe to ďe uŶdeƌstood as ͞iŶdiĐes of ƌeal histoƌǇ͟, pƌoduĐed ďǇ aŶd pƌoduĐtiǀe of 
paƌtiĐulaƌ ďiases: effeĐts that haǀe effeĐts͛ ;ϮϬϭϬ, p. ϯϴͿ. This aŶalogǇ eŵeƌges iŶ paƌt fƌoŵ the 
eŵďeddedŶess of deĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ iŶ ƌelatioŶs of ǀioleŶĐe: it is ͚ĐoŶstƌued as ƌespoŶdiŶg to 
challenges, intimately attentive, listening, sticking, yielding, inverting and displacing, always patient, 
Đalŵ aŶd adaptiǀe͛ ;ϮϬϭϬ, p. ϰϬͿ iŶ a ŵaŶŶeƌ ƌefleĐtiǀe of ŵaƌtial aƌts, paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ t'ai Đhi. BoǁŵaŶ 
elaďoƌates oŶ paƌallel ŵisƌeadiŶgs of deĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ aŶd t'ai Đhi as ͚philosophical, isolated, inward-
looking, navel-gaziŶg: as Ŷot ƌeallǇ ƌeal͛; ďoth aƌe fƌaŵed as ͚digƌessioŶs aǁaǇ fƌoŵ ƌealitǇ, tƌuth, 
aŶd diƌeĐt, pƌaĐtiĐal eŶgageŵeŶt͛ ;ϮϬϭϬ, p. ϰϭͿ. Hoǁeǀeƌ, like t'ai Đhi, deĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ has, he 
demonstrates, a series of concrete praxiological implications. For instance, deconstruction makes 
possiďle a foƌŵ of eŶgageŵeŶt ǁith politiĐal aŶtagoŶists ǁhiĐh eŵphasises ͚listeŶiŶg͛: iŶ ĐoŶtƌast to 
siŵplǇ deŶouŶĐiŶg aŶd disŵissiŶg iŶteƌloĐutoƌs, deĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ ͚listeŶs ďǇ stiĐkiŶg to the otheƌ… 
Derrida listened, stuck and yielded to the texts and institutions of philosophy, in order to invert and 
displaĐe ĐoŶĐeptual oƌdeƌs aŶd foĐi͛ ;ϮϬϭϬ, p. ϰϰͿ. BoǁŵaŶ suggests that iŶ aĐadeŵiĐ ĐoŶteǆts, this 
might mean, for instance, seeking to publish in journals other than those reflecting one's own 
disciplinary and ethico-political commitments, dealing with difference in terms and contexts other 
than the familiar. 
The practical consequences of such deconstructive resistance can be seen in a host of political sites. 
To take the example, first, of feminist political struggles, Diane Elam, for instance, suggests that 
feminism and deconstruction can usefully be read alongside each another because, 
[o]n the one hand, feminism shifts the ground of the political, interrogating the opposition 
between the public and the private spheres. On the other hand, deconstruction displaces 
our understanding of how theory relates to practice by rethinking the opposition of 
philosophical reflection to political action. (1994, p. 1) 
Elam connects the rise of deconstruction to the rise of third-wave feminism, posing the question: 
͚ŵust feŵiŶisŵ alǁaǇs seek to eƌase diffeƌeŶĐe ďǇ giǀiŶg ďiƌth to a faŵilǇ of ideŶtiĐal daughteƌs ǁho 
all fight for the same causes, who all pretend to share the same feminist goals? (1994, p. 73). In 
third-wave feminism's de-esseŶtialisatioŶ of the ĐategoƌǇ ͚ǁoŵaŶ͛, foƌŵs of iŶteƌǀeŶtioŶ ǁhiĐh 
insist upon the inclusion of race, class, age, ethnicity, and sexuality in the forms of intervention they 
proffer have emerged, something which, as Elam shows, has hugely important consequences for 
issues such as the representation of women in institutions of government, abortion, past 
configurations of conjugal rights, gay marriage, and the gendered and Westerncentric writing of 
history, psychoanalysis, and philosophy. 
To the aŶǆieties espoused ďǇ those ǁoƌƌied that pƌoďleŵatisiŶg the ĐategoƌǇ ͚ǁoŵaŶ͛ spells disasteƌ 
for the feminist project, Elam replies: 
this is not the same thing as being condemned to the land of relativistic nihilism, where 
political action—or any action for that matter—ďeĐoŵes iŵpossiďle. UŶĐeƌtaiŶtǇ… is Ŷeitheƌ 
an absolute obstacle to action nor a theoretical bar to political praxis. (1994, p. 31) 
Such interventionism is reflected in Elaŵ's foƌŵulatioŶ of the ŶotioŶ of ͚gƌouŶdless solidaƌitǇ͛, a 
foƌŵ of solidaƌitǇ ͚ǁhiĐh is Ŷot ďased oŶ ideŶtitǇ͛ ďut ƌelies ƌatheƌ upoŶ ͚a ĐoalitioŶ ďuilt aƌouŶd 
suspiĐioŶ of ideŶtitǇ as the esseŶtial gƌouŶdiŶg foƌ ŵeaŶiŶgful politiĐal aĐtioŶ͛ ;ϭϵϵϰ, p. ϲϵ). She 
suggests, iŶ shoƌt, that ͚the gaiŶs of feŵiŶisŵ haǀe pƌoduĐed a situatioŶ iŶ ǁhiĐh the ŵeta-narrative 
of the affirmation of female identity has foundered precisely because its realization can only be 
imperialist'. Consequently, she continues, feminism and deconstruction work similarly towards 
ĐhalleŶgiŶg suĐh esseŶtialisŵ: suĐh aŶ eŶdeaǀouƌ eŶtails ͚eŶdless ǁoƌk, aŶ aďǇssal politiĐs…͛ ;ϭϵϵϰ, 
p. 120). This example shows how the problematisation of foundational claims about sex and gender 
has lead not to the death of feminism but rather to a form of feminism committed to interrogating 
its own past and present exclusions and violences such that it can better resist (although by no 
means entirely avoid) reperforming conventional forms of onto-political ordering in its theoretical 
and concrete interventions. 
Concurrently, in the context of queer activism and queer theory, Joshua Gamson explores the 
controversies which ensued following the announcement made in San Francisco that the 1993 pride 
celebrations weƌe to ďe Ŷaŵed the ͚Yeaƌ of the Queeƌ͛. Foƌ ŵaŶǇ, the sigŶifieƌ ͚Ƌueeƌ͛, GaŵsoŶ 
shoǁs, ͚shakes the gƌouŶd oŶ ǁhiĐh gaǇ aŶd lesďiaŶ politiĐs has ďeeŶ ďuilt[,]… haphazaƌdlǇ 
attempting to build a politics from the rubble of deconstructed collective categories͛ ;ϭϵϵϱ, p. ϯϵϬͿ. 
Fƌoŵ this, GaŵsoŶ Ŷotes, a seƌies of dileŵŵas eŵeƌge ƌegaƌdiŶg ͚foƌ ǁhoŵ, ǁheŶ, aŶd hoǁ aƌe 
staďle ĐolleĐtiǀe ideŶtities ŶeĐessaƌǇ foƌ soĐial aĐtioŶ aŶd soĐial ĐhaŶge?… WheŶ aŶd hoǁ ŵight 
deconstructive strategies take aim at institutional foƌŵs [of oppƌessioŶ]͛. What oĐĐuƌƌed iŶ the shift 
toǁaƌds eŵďƌaĐiŶg the sigŶifieƌ ͚Ƌueeƌ͛, he suggests, ǁas a pƌoĐess of de-essentialisation, the very 
fracturing nature of which was politically salutary: 
Queer movements pose the challenge of a form of organizing in which, far from inhibiting 
accomplishments, the destabilization of collective identity is itself a goal and 
accomplishment of collective action. When this dynamic is taken into account, new 
questions arise. (Gamson, 1995, p. 403, emphasis in original) 
As Gamson shows, the integration of transgender and bisexual issues into the sphere of debate 
represents a concrete effect of such a process of de-essentialisation. Thus, in challenging the 
contours and parameters of subject of resistance, the queer movement displays an imperative 
similar to the generative effects of a deconstructive mode of resistance. 
To turn, finally, to post-colonial politics, Michael Syrotinski has explored what he frames as the 
͚uŶeasǇ eŶĐouŶteƌ ďetǁeeŶ deĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ aŶd the postĐoloŶial͛ ;ϮϬϬϳ, p. ϮͿ. He aƌgues that foƌ 
soŵe, suĐh as ‘oďeƌt YouŶg, ͚Deƌƌida's ǁoƌk has alǁaǇs, eǀeŶ if soŵeǁhat iŶdiƌeĐtlǇ, ĐhalleŶged the 
ethico-politiĐal teŶsioŶs at the heaƌt of ĐoloŶialist ideologǇ͛ ;ϮϬϬϳ, p. ϭϭͿ. Foƌ Alďeƌto Moƌeiƌas, the 
two tƌaditioŶs, “ǇƌotiŶski Ŷotes, shaƌe the ǀieǁ that ͚iŶ oƌdeƌ to ǁƌest the possiďilitǇ of a politiĐal 
affirmation from its continual foreclosure, we require a double articulation, akin to Spivak's 
͞stƌategiĐ esseŶtialisŵ͟ aŶd Deƌƌida's ͞douďle iŶsĐƌiptioŶ͛͟ ;ϮϬϬϳ, p. ϯϲͿ. Foƌ otheƌs, hoǁeǀeƌ, he 
ĐoŶtiŶues, Deƌƌida ͚is ultiŵatelǇ a ƌepƌeseŶtatiǀe of the WesteƌŶ philosophiĐal tƌaditioŶ he is 
deĐoŶstƌuĐtiŶg, aŶd… deĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ is theƌefoƌe at ďest a-political and a-historical, and at worst 
complicitous with a ĐeƌtaiŶ theoƌetiĐal iŵpeƌialisŵ͛ ;ϮϬϬϳ, p. ϭϮͿ. This ƌaises the ƋuestioŶ of the 
Eurocentric and colonising dimensions of deconstructive thought itself. In particular, as Mustapha 
Pasha, amongst others, has shown, there is a danger in many prevailing critical-theoretical traditions 
that the insistence of putting into relief all forms of individual and collective identity in a similar 
manner assumes a general condition of post-foundational subjectivity and its consequences, a move 
which effaces other onto-political configurations (2011; 2013). As a form of engagement based on 
pƌoďleŵatisiŶg its oǁŶ as ǁell as otheƌs͛ iŶteƌǀeŶtioŶs, deĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ ĐaŶ aŶd ŵust ƌespoŶd to its 
own violences, exclusions, and reinscriptions of hierarchy, and view such critique as a matter of 
urgency. In insisting on second- and third-order critiques, deconstruction impels its agent to pursue 
forms of auto-critique which problematise such potential colonialisms to the fullest extent possible, 
which is to say interminably, and without final resolution. 
To restate, I am emphatically not suggesting that the radical political changes associated with third-
wave feminism, queer movements, or post-colonial politics can or should be subsumed within, or be 
conceived of as derivative of or synonymous with, Derrida's thought or deconstruction as a 
philosophical tradition. Rather, the claim made is that the sites of political intervention mentioned 
here share with deconstruction, as I have framed it in this paper, a commitment to attempting to 
resist the hierarchies and exclusions associated with of prevailing forms of ordering by disrupting 
apparently stable categories and assumptions, in particular as regards problematising the subject or 
agent of resistance herself. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has argued that there are a series of ways in which deconstruction contains the potential 
to resist resistance's cooptation back into interrelated processes of conceptual and global ordering. 
Such a form of resistance can be framed as occurring at three interconnected registers. First, as 
EagletoŶ's aĐĐouŶt of its puƌsuit of ͚eǀeƌǇ sŵug ĐoŶĐept͛ suggests, deĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ's ƌadiĐalisŵ 
consists in its resistance to the possibility, or rather its highlighting of the violence of any claim to the 
possibility, of asserting defensibly that a particular issue or problem is not of concern or falls 
͚outside͛ the ďouŶds of oŶe's ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ. IŶasŵuĐh as deĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ highlights ǀioleŶĐe, its 
imperative is to identify and disrupt processes of totalisation wherever they occur. That one cannot 
attend to even a fraction of such processes adequately does not absolve one of this responsibility; 
this state of affairs comprises only a further layer of violence for which one cannot atone. Any claims 
to legitimate borders which demarcate the limits of responsibility are themselves subject to 
deconstructive reflection, and their necessarily forceful imposition demonstrated thereby. Such an 
intervention proceeds on the basis that responsibility is limitless, following the logic of both 
Emmanuel Levinas and Derrida. The all-too-common refusal of such limitless responsibility is thereby 
called into question, and all possible justifications exposed as indefensible. As such, the urgency of 
political intervention is reemphasised. 
As this suggests, second, a deconstructive engagement is radically, if paradoxically, politicising. 
WheŶ the possiďilitǇ of ďeiŶg fiŶallǇ ͚ĐoƌƌeĐt͛ oƌ ͚just͛ is ƌeŵoǀed iŶ the ĐoŶteǆt of the suďjeĐt's 
political deliberations, that is, when it is acknowledged that one's political interventions are 
inexorably violent, that one can only choose between violence and violence, the subject is obliged to 
consider the very difficult question of what s/he would intervene for or against, whether in concrete 
political practice or more conceptually, in spite of its ultimate indefensibility. Far from resulting in 
immobilisation or fatalistic resignation, this encounter with the indefensible can serve to allow the 
subject to encounter the violence of his/her position and commit to it nevertheless. That no position 
ĐaŶ ďe ultiŵatelǇ uŶpƌoďleŵatiĐallǇ ĐoƌƌeĐt does Ŷot ŵeaŶ that ͚aŶǇthiŶg goes͛ oƌ that ͚ŶothiŶg 
ŵatteƌs͛; ƌatheƌ, this apoƌetiĐ ĐoŶditioŶ ŵeaŶs that the Đouƌse of aĐtioŶ oŶe Đhooses ;ďeĐause oŶe 
always chooses, even, and especially, if one attempts to evade the taking of a position) must be 
argued for, defended, and reflected upon constantly in light of new ideas and encounters. 
Furthermore, this condition entails that the responsibility for the subject's position rests with her 
alone, rather than being legitimated in advance by some external principle. This has a denaturalising 
and politicising effect on positions taken, making possible a radical shaking up of notions once 
assumed to be essential or universal. It is to this that Derrida points when he notes that 
deĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ ͚is too politiĐal foƌ soŵe people, ĐaŶ seeŵ paƌalǇziŶg to those ǁho oŶlǇ ƌeĐogŶize 
politics with the help of pre-ǁaƌ slogaŶs͛ ;Đited iŶ Elaŵ, ϭϵϵϰ, p. ϵϬͿ. 
Consequently, the radical potential of deconstruction consists, third, in the extent to which it 
intervenes at the level of conscious and unconscious processes of subject-production and 
reproduction. The question of the subject of resistance is explored by Eagleton, who suggests that 
deconstruction ultimately precludes the possibility of a functional and effective revolutionary 
suďjeĐtiǀitǇ: it pƌeseƌǀes ͚soŵe of the doŵiŶaŶt theŵes of tƌaditioŶal ďouƌgeois liďeƌalisŵ ďǇ a 
desperate, last-ditch strategy: by sacrificing the subject itself, at least in any of its customary modes'. 
The suďjeĐt is ĐoŶseƋueŶtlǇ ƌeŶdeƌed ͚iŵpoteŶt as aŶǇ kiŶd of ageŶt at all, least of all a ƌeǀolutioŶaƌǇ 
oŶe͛ ;ϭϵϴϭ, p. ϭϯϴͿ. IŶ ĐoŶtƌast to this ƌeadiŶg, Deƌƌida suggests that ͚a deĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶist appƌoaĐh 
to the ďouŶdaƌies that iŶstitute huŵaŶ suďjeĐtiǀitǇ… [ĐaŶ] lead to ƌeiŶteƌpƌetatioŶ of the ǁhole 
apparatus of boundaries within which a history and culture have been able to confine their 
ĐƌiteƌiologǇ͛ ;ϭϵϵϮ, p. ϭϵͿ; as suĐh, it is pƌeĐiselǇ the ͚ĐustoŵaƌǇ ŵodes͛ of suďjeĐthood ideŶtified ďǇ 
Eagleton that Derrida seeks to problematise. 
At the heart of Derrida's intervention is the suggestion that prevailing Western modes of 
subjectification themselves are not innocent as regards contemporary concrete ethico-political 
problems, and that resistances to onto-political totalisations can emanate from challenging such 
processes at the level of one's subjecthood. The question that arises here is whether such a 
challenge to conventional forms of subjectivity amounts to a ͚saĐƌifiĐe͛, as EagletoŶ aƌgues, oƌ ƌatheƌ 
a politically salient attempt to reflect upon and intervene in the process of subjectification and 
identity-production and reproduction, as Derrida suggests. For Eagleton, insofar as the subject itself 
become impliĐated iŶ aŶd destaďilised as a ĐoŶseƋueŶĐe of deĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ, the pƌiĐe oŶe paǇs ͚is the 
highest of all: death͛ ;ϭϵϴϭ, p. ϭϯϲͿ. He eǆplaiŶs: 
Deconstruction is the death drive at the level of theory: in dismembering a text, it turns its 
violence masochistically upon itself and goes down with it, locked with its object in a lethal 
complicity that permits it the final inviolability of pure negation. The deconstructionist 
nothing lieth because he nothing affirmeth. (1981, p. 136–7) 
Yet, he continues, such death is not final because metaphysics will live on; similarly deconstruction, 
as a ͚liǀiŶg' death, ǁill ƌegƌoup its foƌĐes to assault aŶeǁ. EaĐh agoŶist is eǀeƌ-slain and ever-
resurrected; the compulsion to repeat, to refight a battle in which antagonist can never be 
destroyed because he is always everywhere and nowhere, to struggle towards a (self)-killing 
that ǁill Ŷeǀeƌ Ƌuite Đoŵe, is the dǇŶaŵiĐ of deĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ… [D]eĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ is kept aliǀe 
by what contaminates it, and can therefore reap the pleasures of a possible self-dissolution 
which, as one form of invulnerability, is mirrored by another, the fact that it can never die 
because the enemy is within and unkillable. (1981, p. 137) 
In short, in this reading deconstruction is self-defeating; it comprises a form of intervention which 
renders it, and its subject, highly vulnerable to its own violent gestures whilst ensuring it, and its 
subject, live on to continue this masochistic process ad infinitum. Key here is the notion that a 
certain pleasure is derived from such self-aŶŶihilatioŶ; EagletoŶ ĐoŶĐludes that ͚the ŵoŵeŶt iŶ 
ǁhiĐh all of this oĐĐuƌs is of Đouƌse the ŵoŵeŶt of jouissaŶĐe oƌ petite ŵoƌt͛ ;ϭϵϴϭ, p. ϭϯϳͿ. 
The ĐƌuĐial ƋuestioŶ thus eŵeƌges of ǁhetheƌ suĐh a ƌadiĐal ͚eŵptǇiŶg out͛ effeĐts aŶǇthing 
politically salient, or whether it simply results in catatonic self-torturing/pleasuring at the precipice 
of a self-styled abyss. In contrast to Eagleton's reading, in the spirit of a more Derridean (and, on a 
different day, Nietzschean) tone, I would suggest that such a death only follows if the subject is 
construed in a particular Cartesian manner. To the degree that it insists upon second- and third-
order critiques—of alternative narratives proffered and of the author of such re-writings herself—in 
addition to initial challenges to processes of conceptual and political ordering, deconstruction aims 
to ͚put ĐoŶsĐiousŶess iŶto ƋuestioŶ iŶ its assuƌed ĐeƌtaiŶtǇ of itself͛ ;Deƌƌida, ϭϵϴϮ, p. ϭϳͿ, aŶd iŶ so 
doing, following gestures made by, amongst others, Nietzsche, Freud, Heidegger and Lacan, to begin 
to think the possibility of post-foundational forms of subjectivity. Eagleton objects to this on the 
basis that Derrida's thought 
ignores the extent to which a certain provisional stability of identity is essential not only for 
psychical well-being but for revolutionary political agency. It contains no adequate theory of 
such agency, since the subject would now seem no more than the decentered effect of the 
semiotic process; and its valuable attention to the split, precarious, pluralistic nature of all 
identity slides at worst into an irresponsible hymning of the virtues of schizophrenia. 
PolitiĐal ƌeǀolutioŶ ďeĐoŵes, iŶ effeĐt, eƋuiǀaleŶt to ĐaƌŶiǀalesƋue deliƌiuŵ… ;ϭϵϵϭ, p. ϭϵϳ–
8) 
In this reading, such self-referentiality and fracturing precisely serves the interests of forces of global 
ordering insofar as a subject possessing particular, if provisional, certitudes about itself and socio-
political orientation is necessary for radical political intervention and resistance. I would suggest, in 
contrast, that to the extent that the micro-workings of ordering occur simultaneously at the level of 
the material and within the subject, learning to explore the ways in which one is formed and 
reformed in light of processes of global and inter-personal ordering can comprise a crucial site of 
political resistance. This is, of course, not to suggest that one can finally identify and thereby 
renounce such processes, but rather that within the confines of these one can attempt to unpick 
parts of oneself such that elements of such micro-gestures of ordering and subject-(re)production 
become at least partially identifiable and interpretable. This reflects closely, for instance, ongoing 
feminist and post-colonial calls for the interrogation of patriarchal and colonial logics at work at the 
level of thought, consciousness, and language, the invisible micro-violences which undergird 
ĐoŶĐƌete politiĐal ǀioleŶĐes. Foƌ HoǇ, suĐh aŶ iŶteƌǀeŶtioŶ aŵouŶts to ͚pƌoposiŶg a diffeƌeŶt ŵoƌal 
psǇĐhologǇ͛ ;ϮϬϬϰ, p.ϭϴϬͿ. “uĐh a pƌoĐess eŶtails that the suďjeĐt take itself as ǁell as its politiĐal 
locale as the object to be resisted; attempting to elucidate the ways which one is always constructed 
as part of, and therefore complicit in, that which one seeks to resist can be, somewhat paradoxically, 
a gesture of both defiance and agency. 
Part of the radicalism of such a deconstructive mode of engagement is its defiance of the licence so 
central to prevailing forms of subjecthood cultivated with contemporary Western societies of the 
ƌight to ͚look aǁaǇ͛, to ƌead liǀes, oƌ taĐitlǇ aĐĐept sĐƌiptiŶg of liǀes, as ďeiŶg of diffeƌiŶg ǀalue, of 
tolerating and sanctioning hierarchies of grievability and mournability (Butler, 2004). In a cultural 
context which accepts and encourages ignorance of and indifference to one's embeddedness in 
relations of violence, deconstruction can enact a form of resistance by insisting on looking, thinking, 
and feeling in sites of acute discomfort from which it would be easier to turn away. In this sense, 
deĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ takes seƌiouslǇ NietzsĐhe's Đall foƌ politiĐal suďjeĐts ǁho aƌe ͚iŶƋuisitiǀe to a fault, 
investigators to the point of cruelty, with unhesitating fingers for the intangible, with teeth and 
stomachs for the most indigestiďle͛ ;ϭϵϵϳ, p. ϯϮͿ, suďjeĐts eŶdeaǀouƌiŶg to ƌesist the ǀioleŶĐes of 
onto-political consolidation in the spheres of the material, the philosophical, and the recesses of 
their own subjecthood. 
 
Notes 
1 Concrete examples of this are too numerous to mention any but a few: one would be the 
prevalence of highly problematic gender politics as seen in many activist sites for instance, in the 
recent scandals surrounding the occurrence and handling of sexual assault and rapes within the 
Socialist Workers Party in the UK; another, the transphobia and colonialisms rife in many feminist 
organisations in Europe and the USA; a third, the widespread use of militarised imagery, clothing, 
and vocabularies utilised in many anti-militarist organisations. Specific examples of these will be 
discussed below. While I am not intending to draw a clear line between acts of resistance and acts 
which are re-entangled into propping up prevailing forms of global ordering—to do so would be 
neither possible nor desirable—what I am suggesting is that there is a widespread problem within 
radical sites, both within and beyond the academy, in that the reproduction of certain violences is 
ignored. This, in my view, amounts to at least a partial reinscription of the forms of resistance 
proffered in these spaces back into normalised forms exclusion and hierarchy characteristic of 
current of global ordering. 
Ϯ IŶ iŶǀokiŶg the ŶotioŶ of ͚ĐoŶĐƌete͛ heƌe, I aŵ aŶtiĐipatiŶg the ĐƌitiĐisŵ that suĐh aŶ auto-
deconstructionist mode of resistance remains aďstƌaĐted aŶd ƌeŵoǀed fƌoŵ ͚ƌeal ǁoƌld͛ oƌ 
͚ŵateƌial͛ iŶteƌǀeŶtioŶ. As ǁill ďe deŵoŶstƌated ďeloǁ, the ƌealŵs of thought aŶd aĐtioŶ, oƌ theoƌǇ 
and practice, are by no means distinct, the one having a direct bearing on the other. 
ϯ The ƋuestioŶ of ͚affiƌŵatioŶisŵ͛ iŶ ĐoŶteŵpoƌaƌǇ ƌadiĐal thought has ďeeŶ skilfullǇ iŶteƌƌogated ďǇ 
Noys (2012). Further discussion of this important critique is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
4 This is to be understood figuratively as a shorthand for indicating the (post)Enlightenment 
exposure of a certain abyss in which stable onto-political foundations and grounds were 
fundamentally undermined, rather than as a claim that religion has ceased to play a crucial role in 
contemporary political life. For discussion of this see the Foƌuŵ eŶtitled ͚IŶteƌŶatioŶal PolitiĐs aŶd 
the ͞Death of God͟', iŶ MilleŶŶiuŵ: JouƌŶal of IŶteƌŶatioŶal “tudies, ϰϮ ;ϭͿ. 
5 The problems of the romanticism of this are important for what follows; such a framing is ripe for a 
deconstructive analysis itself. 
6 There is much more to be said regarding the intersections and parallels between Derrida's 
deĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ aŶd AdoƌŶo's ͚Ŷegatiǀe dialeĐtiĐs͛, iŶ paƌtiĐulaƌ theiƌ diffeƌeŶt fƌaŵiŶgs of the 
relationship between the subject and object of thought. This is, however, unfortunately beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
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